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The Insanity Defense in
Juvenile Delinquency Proceedings
MAXINE M. HARRINGTON, ESQ.·
ANN O'REGAN KEARY, ESQ."

and

The insanity defense in delinquency proceedings poses an important
legal dilemma concerning the rights of children in the juvenile justice
system. Indeed, beyond the purely legal concerns of the rights of an
accused juvenile, the concept of criminal responsibility in the context
of juvenile court proceedings raises perhaps an even more important
issue of what is the best model for dealing with mentally ill juvenile
offenders, both from the juvenile's viewpoint and that of society as a
whole. It is our opinion that not only does the insanity defense have an
appropriate role in juvenile proceedings, but that legal as well as
practical considerations dictate that juveniles be permitted to raise the
defense. Denial of this defense to juveniles poses serious negative
ramifications for our system of justice and the individual accused child.
Between 1966 and 1975, the U.S. Supreme Court broke new ground
in extending certain constitutional rights to children in juvenile
delinquency proceedings. Previously, such children, although charged
with criminal offenses, had been afforded significantly fewer procedural
rights than adults who were charged with the same offenses. Although
during the 1960's, the federal courts and, in particular, the Supreme
Court, had provided many legal protections and safeguards for the
rights of adult criminal defendants, such protections had never been
extended to accused juveniles. Rather, juveniles were treated within the
framework of a system whose goals were rehabilitation and treatment,
as deemed to be in the best interests of the particular child. The
informal, non-adversary nature of juvenile proceedings, which were
labeled "civil" rather than "criminal," had been considered beneficial to
the juvenile and consistent with the rehabilitative purpose of the
juvenile justice system. However, as the Supreme Court recognized in
its 1967 landmark opinion, In re Gault,l important constitutional rights
of children had, in fact, been sacrificed in exchange for the theoretically
beneficial treatment of the civil-style proceedings.
In a series of cases dealing with the juvenile court system, the
Supreme Court has generally held that juveniles charged with criminal
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offenses must be afforded due process safeguards similar to those which
the Court had guaranteed to adult criminal defendants. First, in Kent v.
U.S.,2 the court stated that procedures accorded to juveniles must
measure up to the constitutional essentials of due process and fair
treatment, and that counsel must be provided to the child for
representation at the critical hearing on the issue of whether the child
would be tried in a juvenile or adult proceeding. In the following year,
haVing paved the way inKent, the Court rendered its seminal decision, In
re Gault, which granted accused children many of the minimal due
process rights afforded to adult criminal defendants at trial, including
notice of charges, right to counsel, right to confront and cross-examine
witnesses and the privilege against self-incrimination. The Gault opinion,
which has formed the basis of all subsequent children's rights litigation
and case law, eschewed the long-accepted "civil" label which had
attached to juvenile proceedings. The Court's decision clearly recognized
that "unbridled discretion (of theJuvenile Court), however benevolently
motivated, is frequently a poor substitute for principle and procedure,"3
where the end result may be a child's indefinite confinement in an
institution.
In 1970, the Supreme Court in the case of In re Winship4 expanded the
list of constitutional safeguards available to juveniles when it applied
the adult criminal standard of proof, beyond a reasonable doubt, to
delinquenc1proceedings. Thus, juveniles who previously could have
been adjudicated delinquent and suffered a resulting loss of liberty
merely on the basis of proof by a preponderance of evidence (the civil
standard of proof), were now entitled to a judgment in their favor unless
the prosecution was able to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
juvenile had committed the offense charged.
In 1971, the Court temporarily halted the extension of adult procedural
safeguards to juvenile proceedings by declining to rule that juveniles
were entitled to a trial by jury. In McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,5 the Court
reiterated the need for accused children to have the essentials of due
process and fair treatment in the fact-finding process, yet ruled that trial
by jury was not a concomitant necessity of accurate fact-finding. The
Court's deciSion, which distinguished a trial by jury from the other
safeguards it had considered more integral to accurate fact-finding,
turned in part on the Court's concern that jury trials would alter the
informal and confidential atmosphere of juvenile proceedings, a feature
the Court still deemed beneficial to the children involved.
The last decision in this series of opinions was rendered in 1975 and
involved the application of the double jeopardy principle to juvenile
proceedings. The Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution guarantees
that no person shall twice be put in jeopardy of life or limb for the same
offense. However, since juvenile proceedings had traditionally been
considered civil, as opposed to criminal, proceedings, the defense of
double jeopardy had not previously been afforded to children. In Breed v.
Th. Insanity Def.n ••
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Jones,6 the Supreme Court reaffirmed its position in Gault that juvenile
proceedings were, in fact, criminal in nature, since their "object is to
determine whether he (the child) has committed acts that violate
criminal law and whose potential consequences include both the stigma
inherent in such a determination and the deprivation of liberty for many
years."7 The Court, therefore, extended the protection of the Constitutional double jeopardy clause to juvenile delinquency proceedings.
Despite this flurry oflegal developments in the area of juvenile rights,
the Supreme Court has yet to address the issue of the role of the concept
of criminal responsibility in such proceedings and whether an accused
child- has a right to raise a defense of insanity. The insanity defense, and
the basic concept of conditioning responsibility for one's criminal act
on the capacity to understand the nature of that act and to exercise free
will in acting have traditionally and historically played a significant part
in our criminal justice system. In 1895, the Supreme Court established
the rule in federal courts that "an accused is entitled to acquittal of the
specific crime charged if, upon all the evidence, there is reasonable
doubt whether he was capable in law of committing the crime."8 Today,
all 50 states plus the federal government guarantee an adult accused the
right to assert the defense of insanity in criminal proceedings. If found
legally insane, an accused is thus excused from criminal responsibility
and its attendant punishment (usually with court-ordered psychiatric
treatment as an alternative disposition).
The issue of criminal responsibility, however, has not figured
prominently in the juvenile justice system for the simple reason that
juvenile proceedings were traditionally considered non-criminal. The
focus in juvenile delinquency proceedings rested less on the issue of
culpability for the offense committed than on the rehabilitative needs
of the involved juvenile. Although the Supreme Court has not specifically
confronted the applicability of the insanity defense to juvenile proceedings, its rulings as to other rights attendant to juvenile proceedings
have laid the cornerstone upon which some state courts have ruled in
favor of permitting the insanity defense to be raised in a juvenile case.
One of the first nationally reported cases on this issue, In re Winburn, 9
was decided by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in 1966. The Wisconsin
Court relied heavily upon the Supreme Court's decision in Kent,
guaranteeing due process and fair treatment to juveniles. In Winburn,
this issue of first impression arose from an insanity defense raised by a
15-year-old boy charged with the fatal shooting of his mother. The
Court noted, Significantly, that although the philosophy behind the
Wisconsin juvenile act was rehabilitation and treatment, such enforced
treatment may be deemed punishment of the juvenile involved and
that, in practice, retribution did in fact playa role in the juvenile court's
function. 10 In view of this factor as well as the stigma attached to
adjudication as a juvenile delinquent, the Court concluded that the
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concept of criminal responsibility was relevant to juvenile proceedings.
Moreover, the Court determined that the insanity defense should be
made available, to juveniles as well as adults, as a fundamental right
inherent in the fair treatment prescribed by the Supreme Court, in
order to guard against unjust imposition of punishment upon a
mentally impaired wrongdoer.
Similarly, later cases in California,ll Nevada,12 New Jersey,13 and
Louisiana,14 ruled favorably on the issue of the applicability of the
insanity defense to juvenile proceedings. These State Court opinions,
the majority of which were rendered in the late 1970's, rested
predominantly on an interpretation of the Supreme Court's opinions in
Kent and Gault as establishing the right of a juvenile to avail himself of
this defense as well as other safeguards which played an integral and
legaU y necessary role in ad ult proceedings. Indeed, in State ofLouisiana in
the Interest ofPate Causey15 the Supreme Court of Louisiana noted that the
denial of the right to plead insanity would be violative of an adult
criminal defendant's rights to due process and fundamental fairness
under its state and federal constitutions. The Court concluded that the
juvenile should, therefore, be similarly granted this right since the
function of the insanity defense was essential to fair treatment.
In light of the fairly uniform approach of the state courts addreSSing
this issue, a recent case from the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
is of major 1nterest and significance. In late 1979, the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals rejected the right to interpose an insanity
defense in juvenile proceedings in the case of In re C. W.M. 16 The Court
noted that the function of the insanity defense in adult proceedings "is
not to establish the innocence of the accused but to absolve him of the
moral and penal consequences of his criminal act. "17 Concluding that an
adjudication of delinquency is not a determination of "criminal"
responsibility which results in the impOSition of a penal sanction, the
Court held that in view of the overall rehabilitative purpose of the
juvenile system, the insanity defense would be "superfluous" in a
delinquency proceeding. 18 In reaching this finding, the Court observed
that the District of Columbia's practice of considering the juvenile's
mental condition at the time of disposition, which is analogous to
Sentencing, was adequate to ensure that a child who was mentally ill at
the time of the offense or the time of the disposition hearing would
receive psychiatric care and treatment similar to that provided mentally
ill adult defendants. In re C. W.M. thus turns back the clock to pre-Gault
days when the traditional advocates of the juvenile system held
tenaciously to the unrealistic dream that dispositions of juveniles
adjudicated delinquent resulted in beneficial treatment and rehabilitation
of a clinical rather than a punitive nature.
In re C. W.M. essentially ignores Supreme Court precedent, first
established in Gault, which recognizes that there is a gap between the
original benign beginnings of the juvenile system and its present
Th. In.anlty Def.n ••
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realities. Gault and its progeny had consistently rejected the notion that
an adjudication of delinquency is either" non-criminal" or not geared to
"punish" the child. In re C. W.M. also fails to address adequately the
essential question: does a juvenile have a right not to be adjudicated
culpable for an offense committed while he was unable to appreciate or
understand the nature of his act. Legally, the issue turns on whether the
insanity defense is an essential component of due process and fair
treatment. 20 It can be persuasively argued that the insanity defense is a
fundamental right of due process for adults: the insanity defense has
long been present in English and American jurisprudence, and all 51
jurisdictions presently recognize its vital role in the administration of
criminal justice. Several states' courts have expressly held that denial of
the right to plead insanity violates the fundamental concept of fairness
embodied in due process safeguards. 21 From this one can conclude that
the insanity defense is fundamental to juvenile delinquency proceedings. 22
Perhaps the more important facet of this issue, however, is not
whether the right to plead insanity is legally required as a constitutional
right of all juveniles, but whether it is desirable from either the
juvenile's or society's perspective.
The early juvenile court reformers' dream of solicitude and protection
of juvenile offenders from the harsh consequences of the punitive and
retributive criminal system has regrettably been largely unrealized. It is
today widely recognized that an adjudication of delinquency is far from
harmless and, in fact, may portend grave consequences for the involved
child particularly if he is emotionally disturbed. Many jurisdictions
permit "indefinite" commitment of an adjudicated delinquent to an
institution. 23 In some instances a juvenile can be confined longer than
his adult counterpart for violation of the same law.24 Some jurisdictions,
moreover, allow juveniles to be incarcerated with adults if certain
conditions are met. 2~ Thus, a juvenile can theoretically be placed in an
adult correctional system without having been extended the full
protections of an adult trial, including the right to plead insanity.
There has also been abundant criticism of the "rehabilitative" efforts
of juvenile institutions. In Gault, the Supreme Court was alarmed by the
high recidivist rate of juvenile offenders and concluded that this fact at
least "casts some doubt about the adequacy of treatment afforded
juveniles."26 One study has found that few institutions for juveniles
were providing adequate psychiatric screening or services for emotionally
disturbed youths, and many were failing to meet accepted standards
regarding medical supervision and control. 27 It is not surprising,
therefore, that in recent years, the Courts have witnessed the rise of
juvenile "right to treatment" cases. In one such case, Nelson v. Heyne, 28
decided in 1974, a federal appellate court found that staff of a medium
security "boys school" were inflicting corporal punishment upon the
children (beatings with a wooden paddle) as well as indiscriminately
administering tranquilizing drugs in violation of the children's
276
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constitutional rights to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. The
Court observed that the school failed to provide even the minimal
rehabilitative treatment to which the confined youths were constitutionally entitled.
Apart from the moral and legal issues inherent in inflicting punishment
on an individual whose illness may negate his responsibility, there are
other serious ramifications of a delinquency adjudication. The child is
labeled a "delinquent." Although a juvenile adjudicated delinquent may
not suffer the same civil disabilities as an adult convicted of criminal
acts, the Supreme Court in Gault recognized that in recent years "this
term (delinquent) has come to involve only slightly less stigma than the
term 'criminal' applied to adults."29 In addition, although juvenile
records are ostensibly confidential, court and police records are routinely
disclosed to government agencies, prosecutors and law enforcement
agencies. 30 Thus, an adjudication of delinquency, much like a criminal
conviction, is a label that in future years may continue to be a handicap
to a child.
Other factors also militate in favor of a right to assert the defense of
insanity in juvenile proceedings. The entire concept of criminal
responsibility is based on relieving an individual who cannot understand
the nature of his act from its penal consequences. 31 Sanity and culpability
are closely interrelated in our legal system. Society benefits little from
punishing l child for acts which he did not intend to do, or the
wrongfulness of which he could not appreciate. An adjudication of
delinquency will not impress upon an insane child the significance of his
offense, nor will it necessarily deter him or others from committing
future criminal acts. Thus, denying the child the right to plead insanity
is pointless from a utilitarian point of view, as well as unjust from a
purely legal perspective.
It is also important to note that the availability of other defenses to
criminal responsibility which may be raised by adults are equally
applicable to juvenile proceedings, e.g., accident or self-defense. It is at
once apparent that if the juvenile court system will make distinctions
between an accidental violation of the law and an intentional one, it
should also distinguish acts committed by a child who is legally insane
from those committed by one who understands the full consequences of
his acts. 32
If the insanity defense is not allowed in juvenile cases, the only
alternative is for a court to consider the child's mental condition after he
is adjudicated delinquent at the time of the dispositional hearing. This
alternative was approved by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
in In re C. W.M. as the method to ensure that appropriate treatment
Would be provided to mentally disturbed children who were adjudicated
delinquent. The court rejected the insanity defense, since, arguably, the
mental health of the child and his treatment needs would be considered
at the dispositional hearing where the judge could consider a broad
Th. In.anlty Def.n ••
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range of alternatives. The approach, however, treats alike all accused
children who may exhibit symptoms of a mental illness, and fails to
recognize that mental illness alone does not provide a sufficient basis for
an acquittal by reason of insanity. A child may be mentally ill at the time
of the offense, but not legally insane. A distinction, therefore, should be
made between mentally ill individuals who may be legally responsible
for their acts, and those who are not responsible and who should not,
therefore, suffer the consequences of an adjudication of delinquency.
Further, the practice of considering mental illness at the time of
disposition may not adequately address the problems associated with
children who were legally insane at the time of the offense, but who have
recovered or been restored to mental health by the date of their
disposition, or those children who were legally sane on the date of the
offense, but mentally ill and in need of psychiatric treatment at the later
point of the disposition hearing. As to the latter group, the juvenile
system may be beneficial depending on the quality of psychiatric
programs available to delinquents: it provides that in lieu of incarceration
a child may be committed to a suitable facility for psychiatric treatment.
As to the former category, even if the child has recovered and been
released to the community, the consequences of a delinquency
adjudication are still formidable.
Finally, it cannot be disputed that at the dispositional stage, most
juvenile statutes grant a broad range of discretionary power to the judge
in making commitment or placement decisions. There is no guarantee
that a seriously mentally ill child will be hospitalized and receive needed
treatment. At the most, failure to order such treatment may be
considered a judicial "abuse of discretion" which the child could
challenge only through formal legal proceedings brought by him at a
later time. The practice of addressing the juvenile's mental condition
only with regard to dispositional alternatives thus poses serious practical
as well as legal problems.
Conclusion
The juvenile correctional system has generally failed in its mission of
providing the benevolent treatment intended by the early reformers;
moreover, the stigma of being considered a delinquent may prove
deleterious to the juvenile. For those juveniles who endanger the
public's safety or property, retribution may be an appropriate feature of
the juvenile justice system. Society, however, has an interest in ensuring
that children who are not responsible for their criminal acts are offered
adequate treatment in an appropriate setting. It is important that those
children, who are mentally incapable of appreciating the wrongfulness
of their acts or conforming their behavior to the dictates of the law, be
provided clinical intervention at the earliest possible opportunity.
Absent an adequate program of treatment, the result may be that a
mentally ill child will not be given a chance for effective rehabilitation
278

Bulletin of the AAPL Vol. VIII, No.3

and that, at the termination of his commitment, he will be incapable of
taking his proper place in society.
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